Smith, Alexander D.
Somasse, Gbetonmasse Blaise
I present a dynamic common pool resource experiment where subjects have to make individual withdrawals in 20 rounds of decision-making. The subjects have a group account to withdraw from, that grows round by round depending on how much was left in the account in the previous round. I determine if subjects allow the resource to last through all the rounds. Also I examine what the differences are between the good and bad groups. I observed that some groups have the ability to make the resource last and also the good and bad groups have significant differences in their behaviors. I have found that there are differences in the frequency, persistence, and intensity of the different kinds of behavior that they exhibit.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Major Qualifying Project
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Social Science and Policy Studies