Faculty Advisor

Smith, Alexander D.

Faculty Advisor

Somasse, Gbetonmasse Blaise

Abstract

I present a dynamic common pool resource experiment where subjects have to make individual withdrawals in 20 rounds of decision-making. The subjects have a group account to withdraw from, that grows round by round depending on how much was left in the account in the previous round. I determine if subjects allow the resource to last through all the rounds. Also I examine what the differences are between the good and bad groups. I observed that some groups have the ability to make the resource last and also the good and bad groups have significant differences in their behaviors. I have found that there are differences in the frequency, persistence, and intensity of the different kinds of behavior that they exhibit.

Publisher

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Date Accepted

May 2017

Major

Economic Science

Project Type

Major Qualifying Project

Accessibility

Unrestricted

Advisor Department

Social Science and Policy Studies

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