I present a dynamic public good experiment where subjects endogenously determine contribution productivity by engaging in costly investment. Subjects complete two sequences of ten rounds of decision making. The level of contribution productivity builds from round to round as a function of investment. After investing, subjects decide how much of their remaining endowments to contribute to the public good. I examine if there is a learning effect between the sequences and if subjects are able to behave close to the social optimum. I observe that in Sequence 2, the average rate of investment and the average total profits are closer to the social optimum, indicating that subjects are cooperating and learning the incentives to invest in the public good.

• This report represents the work of one or more WPI undergraduate students submitted to the faculty as evidence of completion of a degree requirement. WPI routinely publishes these reports on its website without editorial or peer review.

Creator

• Ngo, Jacqueline

Publisher

• Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Identifier

• E-project-031416-082140

Award

• Provost's MQP Award

Advisor

• Smith, Alexander D.

Year

• 2016

Date created

• 2016-03-14

Resource type

• Major Qualifying Project

Major

• Economic Science

Rights statement

• In Copyright

Last modified

• 2023-01-20